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MONETARY POLICY AND THE
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
The economy of the United States has suffered a
series of blows in the past few years, including the
fall in equity market values that began in 2000,
cutbacks in capital spending in 2001, the horriﬁc
terrorist attacks of September 11, the emergence of
disturbing evidence of corporate malfeasance, and an
escalation of geopolitical risks. Despite these adversi-
ties, the nation’s economy emerged from its down-
turn in 2001 to post moderate economic growth last
year. The recovery was supported by accommodative
monetary and ﬁscal policies and undergirded by
unusually rapid productivity growth that boosted
household incomes and held down business costs.
The productivity performance was also associated
with a rapid expansion of the economy’s potential,
and economic slack increased over the year despite
the growth in aggregate demand.
After turning up in late 2001, activity began to
strengthen more noticeably early last year. Sharp
inventory cutbacks in 2001 had brought stocks into
better alignment with gradually rising ﬁnal sales, and
ﬁrms began to increase production in the ﬁrst quarter
of 2002 to curtail further inventory runoffs. More-
over, businesses slowed their contraction of invest-
ment spending and began to increase outlays for
some types of capital equipment. Household spend-
ing on both personal consumption items and housing
remained solid and was supported by another install-
ment of tax reductions, widespread price discounting,
and low mortgage interest rates. By midyear, the cut-
backs in employment came to an end, and private
payrolls started to edge higher.
Although economic performance appeared to be
gradually improving, the tentative nature of this
improvement warranted the continuation of a highly
accommodative stance of monetary policy. Accord-
ingly, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
held the federal funds rate at 13⁄4 percent through the
ﬁrst part of the year. In March, however, the FOMC
shifted from an assessment that the risks over the
foreseeable future to its goals of maximum sustain-
able growth and price stability were tilted toward
economic weakness to an assessment that the risks
were balanced.
Around midyear, the economy began to struggle
again. Concerns about corporate governance came
to weigh heavily on investors’ conﬁdence, and geo-
political tensions, especially the situation in Iraq,
elevated uncertainties about the future economic cli-
mate. Equity prices fell during the summer, liquidity
eroded in corporate debt markets, and risk spreads
widened. Businesses once again became hesitant
to spend and to hire, and both manufacturing output
and private payrolls began to decline. State and local
governments struggled to cope with deteriorating
ﬁscal positions, and the economies of some of our
major trading partners remained weak. Although the
already accommodative stance of monetary policy
and strong upward trend of productivity were provid-
ing important support to spending, the Committee
perceived a risk that the near-term weakening could
become entrenched. In August, the FOMC adjusted
its weighting of risks toward economic weakness,
and in November, it reduced the targeted federal
funds rate 50 basis points, to 11⁄4 percent. The policy
easing allowed the Committee to return to an assess-
ment that the risks to its goals were balanced. With
inﬂation expectations well contained, this additional
monetary stimulus seemed to offer worthwhile insur-
ance against the threat of persistent economic weak-
ness and substantial declines in inﬂation from already
low levels.
On net, the economy remained sluggish at the end
of 2002 and early this year. The household sector
continued to be a solid source of demand. Motor
vehicle sales surged at year-end on the tide of another
round of aggressive discounting by the manufactur-
ers, other consumer outlays trended higher, and activ-
ity in housing markets remained exceptionally strong.
Concerns about corporate governance appeared to
recede somewhat late last year, in part because no
new revelations of major wrongdoing had emerged.
However, the ongoing situation in Iraq, civil strife in
Venezuela that has curtailed oil production, and ten-
sions on the Korean peninsula have sustained inves-
tors’ uncertainty about economic prospects and havepushed prices higher on world oil markets. Faced
with this uncertainty, businesses have been cautious
in spending and changed payrolls little, on net, over
December and January.
Mindful of the especially high degree of uncer-
tainty attending the economic outlook in the current
geopolitical environment, the members of the FOMC
believe the most likely outcome to be that fundamen-
tals will support a strengthening of economic growth.
Business caution is anticipated to give way over the
course of the year to clearer signs of improving sales.
Inventories are lean relative to sales at present, and
restocking is likely to provide an additional impetus
to production in the period ahead. The rapid expan-
sion of productivity, the waning effects of earlier
declines in household wealth, and the highly accom-
modative stance of monetary policy should also con-
tinue to boost activity. Although state and local gov-
ernments face budgetary problems, their restraint is
likely to offset only a part of the stimulus from past
and prospective ﬁscal policy actions at the federal
level. In addition, the strengthening economies of our
major trading partners along with the improving com-
petitiveness of U.S. products ought to support demand
for our exports. Taken together, these factors are
expected to lead to a faster pace of economic expan-
sion, while inﬂation pressures are anticipated to
remain well contained.
Monetary Policy, Financial Markets, and
the Economy over 2002 and Early 2003
As economic growth picked up during the early
months of 2002, the FOMC maintained its target
for the federal funds rate at 13⁄4 percent. A sharply
reduced pace of inventory liquidation accounted for a
signiﬁcant portion of the step-up in real GDP growth,
but other indicators also suggested that the economy
was gaining momentum. Reductions in business out-
lays on equipment and software had moderated sig-
niﬁcantly after dropping precipitously in 2001, and
consumer spending was well maintained by sizable
gains in real disposable personal income. Residential
construction activity was spurred by low home mort-
gage interest rates. The improvement in economic
conditions sparked a rally in equity markets late in
the ﬁrst quarter and pushed up yields on longer-term
Treasury instruments and investment-grade corporate
bonds; yields on speculative-grade bonds declined
in reaction to brighter economic prospects and the
perceived reduction in credit risk. Meanwhile, surg-
ing energy prices exerted upward pressure on overall
inﬂation, but still-appreciable slack in resource utili-
zation and a strong upward trend in private-sector
productivity were holding down core price inﬂation.
At both its March and May meetings, the FOMC
noted that the apparent vigor of the economy was
importantly attributable to a slowdown in the pace of
inventory liquidation and that considerable uncer-
tainty surrounded the outlook for ﬁnal sales over the
next several quarters. The Committee was especially
concerned about prospects for a rebound in busi-
ness ﬁxed investment, which it viewed as key to
ensuring sustainable economic expansion. Although
the decline in investment spending during the ﬁrst
quarter of 2002 was the smallest in a year, gloomy
business sentiment and large margins of excess
capacity in numerous industries were likely to ham-
per capital expenditures. According to anecdotal
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94 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2003reports, many ﬁrms were unwilling to expand capac-
ity until they saw more conclusive evidence of grow-
ing sales and proﬁts. At the same time, however, the
FOMC noted that, with the federal funds rate unusu-
ally low on an inﬂation-adjusted basis and consider-
able ﬁscal stimulus in train, macroeconomic policies
would provide strong support to further economic
expansion. Against this backdrop, the Committee at
the March 19 meeting judged the accommodative
stance of monetary policy to be appropriate and
announced that it considered the risks to achieving its
long-run objectives as being balanced over the fore-
seeable future, judgments it retained at its meeting in
early May.
The information reviewed at the June 25–26
FOMC meeting conﬁrmed that the economy was
expanding but at a slower pace than earlier in the
year. As expected, the degree of impetus to economic
activity from decelerating inventory liquidation had
moderated. Residential investment and consumer
spending also had slowed appreciably after surging
earlier in the year. The most recent data on orders
and shipments suggested a small upturn in business
spending on equipment and software, but the
improvement in capital spending appeared to be lim-
ited, unevenly distributed across industries, and not
yet ﬁrmly indicative of sustained advance. Industrial
production continued to increase, and the unemploy-
ment rate declined somewhat.
In ﬁnancial markets, investors and lenders had
apparently become more risk averse in reaction to the
mixed tone of economic data releases, growing geo-
political tensions, further warnings about terrorist
attacks, and additional revelations of dubious corpo-
rate accounting practices. In concert, these develop-
ments pushed down yields on longer-term Treasury
securities, while interest rates on lower-quality corpo-
rate bonds rose notably, and equity prices dropped
sharply. Although the economy continued to expand
and the prospects for accelerating aggregate demand
remained favorable, downbeat business sentiment and
skittish ﬁnancial markets rendered the timing and
extent of the expected strengthening of the expan-
sion subject to considerable uncertainty. In these cir-
cumstances, the FOMC left the federal funds rate
unchanged to keep monetary policy very accommo-
dative and once again assessed the risks to the out-
look as being balanced.
By the time of the August 13 FOMC meeting, it
had become apparent that economic activity had lost
some of its earlier momentum. Turbulence in ﬁnan-
cial markets appeared to be holding back the pace of
the economic expansion. Market participants focused
their attention on the lack of convincing evidence that
the recovery was gaining traction and the possibility
that more news of corporate misdeeds would sur-
face in the run-up to the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s August 14 deadline for the certiﬁca-
tion of ﬁnancial statements by corporate executives.
Although the cumulative losses in ﬁnancial wealth
since 2000 were restraining expenditures by house-
holds, very low mortgage interest rates were helping
to sustain robust demand for housing. Moreover, the
ﬁnancial resources made available by a rapid pace
of mortgage reﬁnancing activity, in combination with
attractive incentives offered by auto manufacturers,
supported other consumer spending. The Committee
continued to judge the prevailing degree of mone-
tary accommodation as appropriate to foster a solid
expansion that would bring the economy to fuller
resource utilization. At the same time, the Commit-
tee recognized the considerable risks to that outlook
and the potential adverse consequences for economic
prospects from possible additional deterioration of
ﬁnancial conditions. The members noted, however,
that a further easing of monetary policy, if it came to
be viewed as appropriate, could be accomplished in
a timely manner. In light of these considerations, the
FOMC opted to retain a target rate of 13⁄4 percent for
the federal funds rate, but it viewed the risks to the
economy as having shifted from balanced to being
tilted toward economic weakness.
When the FOMC met on September 24, data indi-
cated that economic growth had picked up in the third
quarter, on average, buoyed in part by a surge in
motor vehicle production. The uneventful passing of
the mid-August deadline for recertiﬁcation of corpo-
rate ﬁnancial statements brieﬂy alleviated investors’
skittishness in debt and equity markets. However, the
most timely information suggested that some soften-
ing in economic activity had occurred late in the
summer. Those economic reports, along with a darker
outlook for corporate proﬁts and escalating fears of a
possible war against Iraq, led market participants to
revise down their expectations for the economy.
Equity prices and yields on both longer-term Trea-
sury and private securities moved sharply lower in
early autumn. In the Committee’s view, heightened
geopolitical tensions constituted a signiﬁcant addi-
tional source of uncertainty clouding the economic
outlook. Still, fundamentals suggested reasonable
prospects for continued expansion. Accordingly, the
FOMC left the federal funds rate unchanged at the
close of the September meeting but also reiterated its
view that the risks to the outlook were weighted
toward economic weakness.
The information reviewed at the November 6 meet-
ing indicated a more persistent spell of below-par
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pated earlier. With home mortgage rates at very low
levels, residential construction activity remained
high. But consumer spending had decelerated notice-
ably since midsummer under the combined weight
of stagnant employment and declining household
wealth resulting from further decreases in equity
prices. Worries about the potential for war against
Iraq, as well as persistent concerns about the course
of economic activity and corporate earnings, were
apparently engendering a high degree of risk aversion
among business executives that was constraining
capital spending and hiring. Despite a weakening in
the exchange value of the dollar, sluggish economic
growth among major trading partners spelled difﬁcul-
ties for U.S. exports, and a rebound in foreign output
seemed more likely to follow than to lead a rebound
at home. Moreover, economic slack that was larger
and more persistent than previously anticipated ran
the risk of reducing core inﬂation appreciably further
from already low levels. Given these considerations,
the Committee lowered its target for the federal funds
rate 1⁄2 percentage point, to 11⁄4 percent. The rela-
tively aggressive adjustment in the stance of mone-
tary policy was deemed to offset the potential for
greater economic weakness, and the Committee
accordingly announced that it judged risks to the
outlook as balanced with respect to its long-run goals
of price stability and sustainable economic growth.
When the FOMC met on December 10, overall
conditions in ﬁnancial markets had calmed consider-
ably. Indicators of production and spending, however,
remained mixed. The manufacturing sector registered
large job losses in the autumn, and industrial pro-
duction continued its slide, which had begun around
midyear. A more vigorous rebound in business ﬁxed
investment was not evident, and indeed the recent
data on orders and shipments and anecdotal reports
from business contacts generally signaled continued
softness in capital spending. Very low home mort-
gage interest rates were supporting residential con-
struction activity, but consumption expenditures were
sluggish. On balance, the Committee’s view was
that in the absence of major shocks to consumer and
business conﬁdence, a gradual strengthening of the
economic expansion was likely over the coming quar-
ters, especially given the very accommodative stance
of monetary policy and probable further ﬁscal stimu-
lus. The FOMC left the federal funds rate unchanged
and indicated that it continued to view the risks to the
outlook as balanced over the foreseeable future.
By the time of the FOMC meeting on January 28–
29, 2003, it had become apparent that the economy
had grown only slowly in the fourth quarter of last
year, but little evidence of cumulating weakness
appeared in the most recent data, and ﬁnal demand
had held up reasonably well. The escalation of global
tensions weighed heavily on business and investor
sentiment. Firms apparently were remaining very
cautious in their hiring and capital spending, and
equity prices had declined on balance since the
December meeting. But yield spreads on corporate
debt—especially for riskier credits—narrowed further,
and longer-term Treasury yields declined slightly.
Although the fundamentals still pointed to favorable
prospects for economic growth beyond the near term,
geopolitical developments were making it especially
difﬁcult to gauge the underlying strength of the econ-
omy, and uncertainties about the economic outlook
remained substantial. Against this background, the
Committee decided to leave the federal funds rate
unchanged and stated that it continued to judge the
risks to the outlook as balanced.
Economic Projections for 2003
An unusual degree of uncertainty attends the eco-
nomic outlook at present, in large measure, but not
exclusively, because of potential geopolitical devel-
opments. But Federal Reserve policymakers believe
the most probable outcome for this year to be a
pickup in the pace of economic expansion. The cen-
tral tendency of the real GDP forecasts made by the
members of the Board of Governors and the Federal
Reserve Bank presidents is 31⁄4 percent to 31⁄2 per-
cent, measured as the change between the ﬁnal quar-
ter of 2002 and the ﬁnal quarter of this year. The full
range of these forecasts is 3 percent to 33⁄4 percent.
Of course, neither the central tendency nor the range
is intended to convey the uncertainties surrounding










to fourth quarter 1
Nominal GDP ................. 4.1 4 1⁄2–51⁄2 43⁄4–5
Real GDP ..................... 2.8 3–33⁄4 31⁄4–31⁄2
PCE chain-type price index .... 1.9 1 1⁄4–13⁄4 11⁄4–11⁄2
Average level, fourth quarter
Civilian unemployment rate .... 5.9 5 3⁄4–65 3⁄4–6
1. Change from average for fourth quarter of previous year to average for
fourth quarter of year indicated.
96 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2003the individual forecasts of the members. The civilian
unemployment rate is expected to end the year in the
53⁄4 percent to 6 percent range.
Apart from the geopolitical and other uncertain-
ties, the forces affecting demand this year appear,
on balance, conducive to a strengthening of the eco-
nomic expansion. Monetary policy remains highly
accommodative, and federal ﬁscal policy is and likely
will be stimulative. However, spending by many state
and local governments will continue to be restrained
by considerable budget difﬁculties. Activity abroad is
expected to improve this year, even if at a less robust
pace than in the United States; such growth together
with the improving competitiveness of U.S. products
should generate stronger demand for our exports.
Furthermore, robust gains in productivity, though
unlikely to be as large as in 2002, ought to continue
to promote both household and business spending.
Household purchasing power should be supported as
well by a retreat in the price of imported energy
products that is suggested by the oil futures market.
And the adverse effects on household spending from
past declines in equity wealth probably will begin to
wane.
A reduction of businesses’ hesitancy to expand
investment and hiring is critical to the durability of
the expansion, and such a reduction should occur
gradually if geopolitical risks ease and proﬁtability
improves. Inventories are relatively lean, and some
restocking ought to help boost production this year,
albeit to a much smaller extent than did last year’s
cessation of sharp inventory liquidations. In addition,
the continued growth of ﬁnal sales, the tax law provi-
sion for partial expensing of equipment purchases,
replacement demand, and a more hospitable ﬁnancial
environment should induce many ﬁrms to increase
their capital spending. The growth of investment
likely will be tempered, however, by the persistence
of excess capital in some areas, notably the telecom-
munications sector, and reductions in business spend-
ing on many types of new structures may continue
this year.
Federal Reserve policymakers believe that con-
sumer prices will increase less this year than in 2002,
especially if energy prices partly reverse last year’s
sharp rise. In addition, resource utilization likely will
remain sufﬁciently slack to exert further downward
pressure on underlying inﬂation. The central ten-
dency of FOMC members’ projections for increases
in the chain-type price index for personal consump-
tion expenditures (PCE) is 11⁄4 percent to 11⁄2 percent
this year, lower than the actual increase of about
2 percent in 2002.
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS
IN 2002 AND EARLY 2003
In 2002, the United States economy extended the
upturn in activity that began in late 2001. Real GDP
increased 23⁄4 percent over the four quarters of last
year, according to the advance estimate from the
Commerce Department. However, the pace of activ-
ity was uneven over the course of the year, as con-
cerns about emerging economic and political devel-
opments at times weighed heavily on an economy
already adjusting to a succession of shocks from
previous years.
Economic conditions improved through the ﬁrst
part of the year. Household spending on both per-
sonal consumption items and housing remained solid,
businesses curtailed their inventory liquidation and
began to increase their outlays for some types of
capital equipment, and private employment started to
edge higher. But the forward momentum diminished
noticeably later in the year when concerns about
corporate governance put a damper on ﬁnancial mar-
kets and geopolitical developments boosted oil prices
and added to the uncertainty already faced by busi-
nesses about the economic outlook. In the summer,
equity prices fell, risk spreads widened, and liquidity
eroded in corporate debt markets. Businesses’ cau-
tion was reﬂected in their reluctance to substantially
boost investment, restock inventories, or add to pay-
rolls. Responding to these developments, as well as
some weakening in demand from abroad, manufac-
turers trimmed production during the fall. Employ-
ment at private businesses declined again, and the
unemployment rate rose to 6 percent in December.
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NOTE. Here and in subsequent charts, except as noted, annual changes are
measured from Q4 to Q4, and change for a half-year is measured between its
final quarter and the final quarter of the preceding period. 
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all recovery, output per hour in the nonfarm business
sector grew 33⁄4 percent over the year—an extraor-
dinary increase even by the standards of the past half
decade or so.
Signals on the trajectory of the economy as we
enter 2003 remain mixed. Some of the factors that
had noticeably restrained the growth of real GDP
in the fourth quarter of last year—most especially a
sharp decline in motor vehicle production—are not
on track to be repeated. Moreover, employment lev-
eled off on average in December and January, and
readings on industrial production have had a some-
what ﬁrmer tone of late. Nevertheless, the few data in
hand suggest that the economy has not yet broken out
of the pattern of subpar performance experienced
over the past year.
Consumer price inﬂation moved up a bit last year,
reﬂecting sharply higher energy prices. Excluding
the prices of food and energy items, the price index
for personal consumption expenditures increased
13⁄4 percent, about 1⁄4 percentage point less than in
2001; this deceleration most likely resulted from
continued slack in labor and product markets, robust
gains in productivity, and somewhat lower expecta-
tions of future inﬂation.
The Household Sector
Consumer Spending
Consumer spending grew at a moderate pace last year
and, on the whole, continued to be an important
source of support for overall demand. Personal con-
sumption expenditures rose 21⁄2 percent in real terms,
near the 23⁄4 percent increase in 2001 and down from
the more than 4 percent average growth over the
preceding several years. Sales of new motor vehicles
fell only a little from the extremely high levels of late
2001; outlays were especially strong during the sum-
mer and late in the year, when manufacturers were
offering aggressive price and ﬁnancing incentives.
Growth of spending on other durable goods was well
maintained last year as well, although the gains were
smaller than is often seen early in an economic
recovery; in contrast to the situation in many previ-
ous cycles, spending on durable goods did not decline
sharply during the recession and so had less cause to
rebound as the recovery got under way. Apart from
outlays on durable goods, spending for most cate-
gories of consumer goods and services increased at a
moderate rate last year.
That moderate rate of aggregate consumption
growth was the product of various crosscurrents. On
the positive side, real disposable personal income
rose nearly 6 percent last year, the fastest increase in
many years. Strong productivity growth partially off-
set the effects of stagnant employment in restricting
the growth of household income, and the phase-in of
additional tax reductions from the Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 boosted
household purchasing power appreciably. In addition,
high levels of mortgage reﬁnancing allowed home-
owners to reduce their monthly payments, pay down
more costly consumer credit, and, in many cases,
extract equity that could be used to support other
spending. On the negative side, household wealth
again moved lower last year, as continued reductions
in equity values outweighed further appreciation of
house prices. By the end of the third quarter, accord-
ing to the Federal Reserve’s ﬂow-of-funds accounts,
the ratio of household net worth to disposable income
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98 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2003had reversed nearly all of its run-up since the mid-
1990s.
Consumer conﬁdence, which had declined during
most of 2001 and especially after the September 11
attacks, picked up in the ﬁrst half of last year, accord-
ing to both the Michigan Survey Research Center
(SRC) and Conference Board surveys. However, con-
ﬁdence retreated over the summer along with the
drop in equity prices, and by early this year, con-
sumer conﬁdence again stood close to the levels
of late 2001. These levels of consumer conﬁdence,
though at the bottom of readings of the past several
years, are nevertheless above levels normally associ-
ated with recession.
The personal saving rate, which has trended
notably lower since the early 1980s, moved above
4 percent by late last year after having averaged
21⁄4 percent in 2001. The saving rate has been buf-
feted during the past two years by surges in income
induced by tax cuts and by spikes in spending associ-
ated with variations in motor vehicle incentives. But,
on balance, the extent of the increase in the saving
rate has been roughly consistent with a gradual
response of consumption to the reduction in the ratio
of household wealth to disposable income.
Residential Investment
Real expenditures on residential investment increased
6 percent in 2002—the largest gain in several years.
Demand for housing was inﬂuenced by the same
factors affecting household spending more generally,
but it was especially supported by low interest rates
on mortgages. Rates on thirty-year ﬁxed-rate mort-
gages, which stood at around 7 percent in the ﬁrst
months of the year, fell to around 6 percent by the
autumn and dipped below that level early this year—
the lowest in thirty-ﬁve years. Not surprisingly, atti-
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NOTE. The data are quarterly. The wealth-to-income ratio is the ratio of
household net worth to disposable personal income and extends through
2002:Q3; the personal saving rate extends through 2002:Q4. 
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contract rates on thirty-year mortgages. 
SOURCE. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. 
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gan SRC, remained quite favorable.
Starts of new single-family homes were at
1.36 million units last year, 7 percent above the
already solid pace for 2001. Sales of both new and
existing homes were brisk as well. Home prices
continued to rise but at a slower rate than in 2001, at
least according to some measures. The repeat-sales
price index for existing homes rose 51⁄2 percent over
the four quarters ended in 2002:Q3, a slowing from
the 83⁄4 percent increase over the comparable year-
earlier period. The constant-quality price index for
new homes rose 41⁄2 percent last year, but this
increase was close to the average pace over the past
few years. At the same time, measures of house
prices that do not control for the mix of homes sold
rose considerably more last year than in 2001, a
difference indicating that a larger share of transac-
tions were in relatively expensive homes.
In the multifamily sector, starts averaged a solid
345,000 units last year, an amount in line with that
of the preceding several years. However, the pace
of building slowed a little in the fall. Apartment
vacancy rates moved notably higher last year and rent
and property values declined; these changes suggest
that the strong demand for single-family homes may
be eroding demand for apartment space.
Household Finance
Households continued to borrow at a rapid pace
last year; the 91⁄4 percent increase in their debt out-
standing was the largest since 1989. Low mortgage
interest rates helped spur both very strong home
purchases and reﬁnancing of existing loans, which
together increased home mortgage debt 111⁄2 percent.
Reﬁnancing activity was especially elevated in the
fourth quarter, when ﬁxed mortgage interest rates
dipped to around 6 percent. Torrid reﬁnancing activ-
ity helps explain last year’s slowdown of consumer
credit, which is household borrowing not secured
by real estate: A signiﬁcant number of households
reportedly extracted some of the equity from their
homes at the time of reﬁnancing and used the pro-
ceeds to repay other debt as well as to ﬁnance home
improvements and other expenditures. According to
banks that participated in the Federal Reserve’s
Senior Loan Ofﬁcer Opinion Survey on Bank Lend-
ing Practices in October, the frequency and size
of cash-out reﬁnancings were substantially greater
than had been reported in the January 2002 sur-
vey. Although automakers’ﬁ nancing incentives and
attractive cash rebates stimulated a substantial
amount of consumer borrowing, the growth rate of
consumer credit in 2002, at 41⁄4 percent, was more
than 21⁄2 percentage points below the pace in 2001.
Even though households took on a large amount of
mortgage debt last year, extraordinarily low mortgage
rates kept the servicing requirement for that debt
(measured as a share of homeowners’ disposable
income) well below its previous peak levels. More-
over, reﬂecting large gains in residential real estate
values, equity in homes has continued to increase
despite sizable debt-ﬁnanced extractions. The com-
bined inﬂuence of low interest rates and the sizable
gain in disposable personal income also kept the total
servicing costs faced by households—which in addi-
tion to home mortgage payments include costs of
other ﬁnancial obligations such as rental payments
of tenants, consumer installment credit, and auto
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100 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2003leases—relative to their incomes below previous
peaks. Against this backdrop, broad measures of
household credit quality deteriorated very little last
year, and signs of ﬁnancial stress were conﬁned
mainly to the subprime segment of the market. Delin-
quency rates on home mortgages inched up, while
those on auto loans at ﬁnance companies were ﬂat.
Delinquency rates on credit cards bundled into secu-
ritized asset pools remained close to those of recent
experience.
The Business Sector
Overall business ﬁxed investment moved lower last
year, although the decline was not nearly so precipi-
tous as in 2001. Outlays for equipment and software
edged up, but spending on structures fell sharply.
Financing conditions worsened over the summer,
with equity prices declining, initial public offerings
(IPOs) drying up, credit market spreads widening,
and banks tightening up somewhat on credit stan-
dards in the wake of increased reports of corporate
malfeasance. In addition, geopolitical concerns
increased ﬁrms’ already heightened uncertainty about
the economic outlook. These factors contributed to
an apparent deterioration in business conﬁdence, and
businesses still have not felt any great urgency to
boost investment appreciably. For similar reasons,
although ﬁrms slowed their rate of inventory liquida-
tion last year, they have yet to undertake a sustained
restocking.
Fixed Investment
After dropping sharply in 2001, real spending on
equipment and software rose 3 percent last year.
Spending on high-technology equipment, one of the
hardest-hit sectors in 2001, showed signs of uneven
improvement. The clearest rebound was in comput-
ing equipment, for which spending rose 25 percent in
real terms; this gain fell short of the increases posted
in the late 1990s but far more than reversed the
previous year’s decline. Software investment also
turned positive, rising 6 percent after declining about
3 percent in 2001. By contrast, real outlays for com-
munications equipment were reported to be up only
slightly in 2002 after plummeting 30 percent in 2001.
Business spending on aircraft fell sharply last year.
Airlines were hit especially hard by the economic
downturn and by the reduction in air travel after the
September 11 attacks; although expenditures for new
aircraft held up through the end of 2001 because of
the very long lags involved in producing planes,
shipments of planes slowed greatly thereafter. Mean-
while, business outlays on motor vehicles edged up
last year. Demand for autos and light trucks by rental
companies weakened sharply along with the drop in
air trafﬁc that occurred after September 11 but recov-
ered gradually over the course of last year. Purchases
of medium and heavy trucks fell off overall, despite
the fact that demand for heavy (class 8) trucks was
boosted by spending in advance of the implementa-
tion of more-stringent environmental regulations.
Investment in equipment other than high-tech
and transportation goods moved modestly higher
through most of last year, as real outlays for indus-
trial machinery and a wide range of other equip-
ment gradually strengthened through the summer.
Although spending edged lower again in the fourth
quarter, investment in non-high-tech, nontransporta-
tion equipment increased 31⁄2 percent for the year as a
whole.
Spending on equipment and software was sup-
ported last year by low interest rates, which helped
hold down the cost of capital, as did the tax provision
enacted in March 2002 that allows partial expensing
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Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 101of new equipment and software purchased before
September 11, 2004. Moreover, modest increases
in ﬁnal sales together with replacement demand no
doubt spurred many ﬁrms to make new capital out-
lays. Nevertheless, some sectors, most notably tele-
communications, probably still had excess holdings
of some forms of capital. Concerns about corporate
malfeasance, which had become more intense over
the spring and summer, weighed heavily on ﬁnan-
cial markets and raised the cost of capital through
reduced share prices and higher yields on the bonds
of lower-rated ﬁrms. In addition, uncertainty about
the geopolitical situation, including the possible con-
sequences for oil prices of an outbreak of war with
Iraq, likely made many ﬁrms reluctant to commit
themselves to new expenditures. In all, businesses
have been, and appear to remain, quite cautious about
undertaking new capital spending projects.
Real business spending for nonresidential struc-
tures declined sharply for a second year in 2002.
Outlays for the construction of ofﬁce buildings and
industrial buildings were especially weak. Vacancy
rates for such buildings increased throughout the
year, and property values and rents moved lower.
Construction of new hotels and motels also fell con-
siderably, reﬂecting the weakness in the travel indus-
try. By contrast, spending on other commercial
buildings, such as those for retail, wholesale, and
warehouse space, moved only a little lower last year.
A number of factors likely account for investment
in structures having been much weaker than invest-
ment in equipment. Structures depreciate very slowly,
so businesses can defer new outlays without incur-
ring much additional deterioration of their capital
stock. And unlike investment in equipment, spending
on structures is not eligible for partial expensing.
According to some analysts, concerns about addi-
tional acts of terrorism (and, until late in the year, the
lack of insurance to cover such events) may also have
had a damping effect on some types of construction,
particularly large ‘‘trophy’’ projects.
Inventory Investment
The sharp inventory runoffs that characterized the
economic downturn, together with gradually rising
ﬁnal sales, implied that, by early last year, stocks
were in much better alignment with sales than had
been the case during 2001. Accordingly, businesses
lessened the pace of inventory liquidation early in the
year and by summer had turned to some modest
restocking. However, ﬁrms appeared to have exerted
tight control over production and inventories; with
prospects for the strength of the recovery having
diminished in the second half of the year, businesses
quickly cut production, and inventories only edged
up in the fourth quarter, according to incomplete and
preliminary data. In all, total inventories were about
unchanged last year compared with a liquidation of
more than $60 billion in 2001, and this turnaround
contributed 1 percentage point to the growth of real
GDP over the year. At year-end, inventory-to-sales
ratios in most sectors stood near the low end of their
recent ranges.
In the motor vehicle industry, last year’s very
strong sales were matched by high levels of produc-
tion, and the stock of inventories, especially for light
trucks, appeared at times to be higher than the indus-
try’s desired levels. Nevertheless, the surge in sales
late in the year helped to pare stocks, and dealers
ended the year with inventories of light vehicles at a
comfortable level.
Corporate Proﬁts and Business Finance
The proﬁtability of the U.S. nonﬁnancial corporate
sector improved from its lows of 2001 but relative
to sector output remained at the low end of the range
experienced over the past thirty years. Economic
proﬁts of nonﬁnancial corporations—that is, book
proﬁts adjusted for inventory valuations and capital
consumption allowances—rebounded in late 2001
and were little changed through the third quarter
of last year. The sluggish expansion of aggregate
demand and the lack of pricing power associated with
intense competitive pressures were the main factors
that held down proﬁts in 2002. Also playing a role,
especially in the manufacturing sector, were costs
arising from underfunded deﬁned-beneﬁt pension
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102 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2003plans. Reﬂecting the pause in economic growth, earn-
ings reports for the fourth quarter indicate that proﬁts
may have dropped some late in the year.
A dearth of expenditures on ﬁxed capital and mori-
bund merger and acquisition activity were the chief
culprits behind the sluggish pace of nonﬁnancial cor-
porate borrowing last year. Also important was the
propensity of some ﬁrms to draw on liquid assets—
which began the year at high levels—rather than to
seek external ﬁnancing. Consequently, debt of the
nonﬁnancial corporate sector expanded only 11⁄2 per-
cent, a rate slower than the already subdued pace in
2001. The composition of business borrowing was
dominated last year, as it was in 2001, by longer-term
sources of funds. Robust demand for higher-quality
corporate debt on the part of investors, combined
with the desire of ﬁrms to lock in low interest rates,
prompted investment-grade corporations to issue a
large volume of bonds during the ﬁrst half of 2002.
With funding needs limited, investment-grade issuers
continued to use the proceeds to strengthen their
balance sheets by reﬁnancing higher-coupon bonds
and by paying down short-term obligations such as
bank loans and commercial paper. Buoyed by declin-
ing yields, gross issuance of below-investment-grade
bonds for the most part also held up well during the
ﬁrst half, although this segment of the market was
hit hard after revelations of corporate malfeasance, as
investors shunned some of the riskiest issues; issu-
ance was especially weak in the beleaguered telecom
and energy sectors, which continue to be saddled
with overcapacity and excessive leverage. Despite
falling share prices, seasoned equity offerings were
also well maintained over the ﬁrst half of the year,
in part because of the decision of some ﬁrms—
especially in the telecom and energy sectors—to
reduce leverage. IPOs, by contrast, were sparse. The
evaporation of cash-ﬁnanced mergers and acquisi-
tions and desire by ﬁrms to conserve cash kept equity
retirements at their slowest pace since 1994.
Over the summer, investors grew more reluctant
to buy corporate bonds because of concerns about
the reliability of ﬁnancial statements, deteriorating
credit quality, and historically low recovery rates on
defaulted speculative-grade debt. Macroeconomic
data suggesting that the economic recovery was
losing momentum and widespread company warn-
Before-tax profits of nonfinancial corporations  
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Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 103ings about near-term proﬁts pushed yields on
speculative-grade debt sharply higher. Risk spreads
on investment-grade bonds also widened appreciably
in the third quarter, as yields in that segment of the
corporate bond market declined less than those on
Treasury securities of comparable maturity. Inves-
tors’ aversion to risk was also heightened by mount-
ing tensions with Iraq; by early autumn, risk spreads
on junk-rated bonds reached their highest levels in
more than a decade. Gross bond issuance both by
investment-grade and below-investment-grade ﬁrms
fell off markedly, and the amount of redemptions was
large. By the third quarter, net issuance of bonds by
nonﬁnancial corporations had turned negative for the
ﬁrst time since the early 1950s. Trading conditions
in the corporate bond market deteriorated during this
period, as bid–asked spreads reportedly widened in
all sectors. With share prices dropping and stock
market volatility increasing, issuance of seasoned
equity nearly stalled in the summer and early autumn.
IPOs were virtually nonexistent amid widely publi-
cized investigations into the IPO allocation process at
large investment banks.
A smattering of more upbeat news about the econ-
omy in mid-autumn and the absence of major reve-
lations of corporate wrongdoing sparked a rally in
equity prices and rekindled investors’ appetite for
corporate debt. Over the remainder of the year
and during early 2003, risk spreads narrowed con-
siderably on investment-grade corporate bonds—
especially for the lowest rated of these issues—and
even more on speculative-grade bonds, although they
remained high by historical standards. In the mean-
time, liquidity in the corporate bond market generally
improved. A brightening of investor sentiment caused
a rebound in gross bond issuance, with ﬁrms continu-
ing to use bond proceeds to reﬁnance long-term debt
and to pay down short-term debt. Rising stock prices
and reduced volatility also allowed seasoned equity
issuance to regain some ground in the fourth quarter.
The improved tone in corporate debt markets carried
over into early 2003. Gross corporate bond issuance
continued at a moderate pace, and despite the drop in
stock prices in the latter half of January, seasoned
equity issuance has been reasonably well maintained.
IPO activity and venture capital ﬁnancing, however,
remained depressed.
The heavy pace of bond issuance, sagging capital
expenditures, and diminished merger and acquisition
activity allowed ﬁrms to pay down large amounts of
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104 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2003both business loans at banks and commercial paper
last year. The runoff in business loans that started in
early 2001 intensiﬁed in the ﬁrst half of 2002. At the
same time, commercial paper issuers that were per-
ceived as having questionable accounting practices
encountered signiﬁcant investor resistance, and most
of these issuers discontinued their programs. Bond
rating agencies stepped up the pressure on ﬁrms to
substitute longer-term debt for shorter-term debt and
thereby reduce rollover risk. In addition, banks raised
the total cost of issuing commercial paper by tight-
ening underwriting standards and boosting fees and
spreads on the associated backup lines of credit—
especially for lower-rated issuers. In doing so,
respondents to the April Senior Loan Ofﬁcer Opinion
Survey on Bank Lending Practices cited heightened
concerns about the deterioration of issuers’ credit
quality and a higher probability of lines being drawn.
Many commercial paper issuers either turned to
longer-term ﬁnancing or dropped out of the credit
markets altogether, and the volume of nonﬁnancial
commercial paper outstanding shrank about one-
fourth during the ﬁrst six months of the year after
having dropped one-third in 2001.
The volatility that gripped equity and bond markets
around midyear, however, did not spill over to the
commercial paper market. Quality spreads in the
commercial paper market were largely unaffected, in
part because many of the riskiest issuers had already
exited the market, while others had strengthened their
cash positions and signiﬁcantly reduced rollover risk
earlier in the year. Indeed, because of difﬁculties in
the corporate bond market, some nonﬁnancial ﬁrms
turned temporarily to the commercial paper market to
obtain ﬁnancing, and the volume of outstanding paper
rose in July after a lengthy period of declines. Over
the remainder of the year, business loans at banks and
commercial paper outstanding contracted rapidly, as
inventory investment remained negligible, and ﬁrms
continued to take advantage of relatively low longer-
term interest rates by issuing bonds.
A decline in market interest rates and improved
proﬁtability helped reduce the ratio of net interest
payments to cash ﬂow in the nonﬁnancial corporate
sector last year. Even so, many ﬁrms struggled to
service their debt, and corporate credit quality dete-
riorated markedly. The trailing average default rate
on corporate bonds, looking back over the preceding
twelve months, was already elevated and climbing
when WorldCom’s $26 billion default in July pro-
pelled the average rate to a record level. The amount
of nonﬁnancial corporate debt downgraded by
Moody’s Investors Service last year was more than
fourteen times the amount upgraded. At less than
25 percent, the average recovery rate in 2002 on all
defaulted bonds—as measured by the price of bonds
at default—was at the low end of recovery rates over
the past decade. Delinquency rates on business loans
at commercial banks rose noticeably before stabiliz-
ing in the second half of the year, and charge-off rates
remained quite high throughout 2002.
After expanding rapidly in 2001, commercial mort-
gage debt grew much more slowly during the ﬁrst
quarter of last year, as business spending on nonresi-
dential structures fell. Despite the continued contrac-
tion in outlays on nonresidential structures, commer-
cial mortgage debt accelerated over the remainder of
the year, apparently because of reﬁnancing to extract
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Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 105a signiﬁcant portion of equity from existing proper-
ties. The issuance of commercial-mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS), a key source of commercial real
estate ﬁnancing in recent years, was well maintained
in 2002. Even as ofﬁce vacancy rates rose, the quality
of commercial real estate credit remained stable last
year. Commercial banks ﬁrmed standards on com-
mercial real estate loans in 2002, on net, and delin-
quency rates on commercial real estate loans at banks
stayed at historically low levels. Delinquency rates
on CMBS leveled off after increasing appreciably in
late 2001, and forward-looking indicators also do not
suggest elevated concerns about prospective defaults:
Yield spreads on CMBS over swap rates remained in




Despite modest economic growth, the federal budget
position deteriorated sharply in 2002. After running a
uniﬁed budget surplus of $127 billion in ﬁscal 2001,
the federal government posted a deﬁcit of $158 bil-
lion in ﬁscal 2002—and that deﬁcit would have been
$23 billion larger if not for the shifting of some
corporate tax payments from ﬁscal 2001 to ﬁscal
2002. After adjustment for that tax shifting, receipts
declined 9 percent in ﬁscal 2002: A $50 billion drop
in corporate payments stemmed largely from tax
provisions enacted in the 2002 stimulus bill (espe-
cially the partial-expensing provision on investment),
and a decline in individual tax payments of $136 bil-
lion was largely attributable to a drop in capital gains
realizations and to lower tax rates that were enacted
in the 2001 tax bill.
Meanwhile, federal outlays increased nearly 8 per-
cent in ﬁscal 2002 and 11 percent excluding a decline
in net interest expenses. Spending increased notably
in many categories, including defense, homeland
security, Medicaid, and income security (which
includes the temporary extended unemployment com-
pensation program). Federal government consump-
tion and investment—the part of spending that is
counted in GDP—rose more than 7 percent in real
terms in 2002. (Government spending on items such
as interest payments and transfers are not counted in
GDP because they do not constitute a direct purchase
of ﬁnal production.)
The turn to deﬁcit in the uniﬁed budget means that
the federal government, which had been contribut-
ing to national saving since 1997, began to reduce
national saving last year. The reversal more than
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106 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2003offset an increase in saving by households and busi-
nesses, and gross national saving declined to 15 per-
cent of GDP by the third quarter of last year—the
lowest national saving rate since the 1940s.
After it reentered the credit markets as a signiﬁcant
borrower of net new funds in the second half of 2001,
the Treasury continued to tap markets in volume last
year. Federal net borrowing was especially brisk over
the ﬁrst half of the year. With federal debt rapidly
approaching its statutory borrowing limit, the Secre-
tary of the Treasury declared a debt ceiling emer-
gency on May 16 and identiﬁed about $80 billion
worth of accounting measures that could be used to
create ﬁnancing room within the existing $5.95 tril-
lion limit. The Secretary’s announcement and subse-
quent employment of one of these devices—in which
Treasury securities held in government trust funds
were temporarily replaced by Treasury IOUs not
subject to the debt ceiling—had little effect on Trea-
sury yields, as market participants were apparently
conﬁdent that the ceiling would be raised in time to
avoid default. And indeed, the Congress approved
legislation raising the statutory borrowing limit to
$6.4 trillion on June 27. With its credit needs remain-
ing substantial, the Treasury continued to borrow
heavily over the second half of 2002. The increase
in the Treasury’s net borrowing last year caused the
ratio of publicly held debt to nominal GDP to rise for
the ﬁrst time since 1993.
State and Local Governments
State and local governments have continued to
struggle in response to sluggish growth of receipts. In
the current ﬁscal year (which ends June 30 for most
states), most state governments are reported to be
facing signiﬁcant shortfalls. Although a variety of
strategies may be available for the purpose of techni-
cally complying with balanced-budget requirements,
including tapping nearly $20 billion in combined
rainy-day and general fund balances and turning to
the capital markets, many states will be forced to
boost revenues and hold the line on spending.
Real expenditures for consumption and gross
investment by state and local governments rose less
than 2 percent in 2002—the smallest increase in ten
years. The slowdown in spending growth was wide-
spread across expenditure categories and included
notably smaller increases in outlays for construction.
Employment in the state and local sector continued to
rise in 2002, but at a slower rate than in recent years.
Debt of the state and local government sector
expanded last year at the fastest pace since 1987.
Governments used the proceeds to ﬁnance capital
spending and to refund existing debt in advance. Net
issuance of short-term municipal bonds was also well
maintained, as California and some other states fac-
ing ﬁscal difﬁculties turned to shorter-term borrow-
ing while fashioning more permanent solutions to
their budget problems. Worsening budget situations
contributed to some deterioration in municipal credit
quality last year. Credit-rating downgrades outpaced
upgrades by a signiﬁcant margin, and the yield spread
of BBB-rated over insured AAA-rated municipal
bonds rose signiﬁcantly over the second half of 2002.
The External Sector
The U.S. current account deﬁcit widened again in
2002 after a brief respite during the cyclical slow-
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Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 107down in 2001. Two-thirds of the expansion of the
deﬁcit last year was attributable to a decline in the
balance on goods and services, although net invest-
ment income also fell sharply as receipts from abroad
declined more than payments to foreign investors in
the United States. The broad exchange value of the
dollar peaked around February 2002 after appreciat-
ing about 13 percent in real terms from January 2000;
in early February 2003 it was down about 5 percent
from the February 2002 level.
Trade and the Current Account
Both exports and imports rebounded in 2002 as the
cyclical downturn of the previous year was reversed
and spending on travel recovered from the post-
September 11 slump. As is often the case, the ampli-
tude of the recent cycle in trade has been greater than
that of real GDP. In 2001, stagnant real GDP in the
United States and abroad was coupled with declines
of 111⁄2 percent in real exports and 8 percent in real
imports. Last year, moderate growth of both foreign
and domestic real GDP was exceeded by gains of
5 percent and 9 percent, respectively, in our real
exports and imports. The faster growth of imports
relative to exports over the past two years was consis-
tent with the historical pattern in which the respon-
siveness of imports to income is greater in the United
States than in the rest of the world. Although the
dollar depreciated on balance last year, the lagged
effects of its prior appreciation over the two previous
years contributed to the faster growth in imports
relative to exports in 2002.
Real exports of goods posted a strong gain in the
second quarter of 2002 after six consecutive quarters
of decline. However, as output growth slowed abroad,
exports decelerated in the third quarter and then fell
in the fourth quarter. On balance, exports of goods
rose about 2 percent over the course of the year,
reversing only a small portion of the previous year’s
decline. Not surprisingly, the increase in goods
exports in 2002 was concentrated in the destinations
where GDP growth was strongest—Canada, Mexico,
and several developing Asian economies. A gain of
12 percent in real exports of services in 2002
more than reversed the previous year’s decline and
reﬂected both a pickup in tourism and an increase in
other private services. Export prices turned up in the
second quarter after a year of decline and continued
to rise at a moderate pace in the second half.
The very rapid growth of real imports of goods in
the ﬁrst half of last year was a reaction to the revival
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108 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2003of U.S. activity, and they gained about 9 percent over
the year. The particularly large gains in imports of
consumer goods and automotive products reﬂected
the buoyancy of U.S. consumption expenditures.
Imports of most major categories of capital goods
also increased on balance over the year. However,
as with exports, import growth was considerably
stronger in the ﬁrst half of the year than in the
second. This pattern likely reﬂected the deceleration
in U.S. GDP, along with the effects of some deprecia-
tion of the dollar. In addition, there may have been
some shifting of import demand from later in the year
to the earlier months as it began to appear more likely
that labor contract negotiations at West Coast ports
would not go smoothly.1 Imports of services more
than reversed their 2001 decline over the course
of the year, and gains were recorded for both travel
and other private services. Prices of non-oil imports
turned up in the second quarter after declining over
the preceding four quarters, as a result of the weaker
exchange rate and a turnaround in prices of inter-
nationally traded commodities.
The spot price of West Texas intermediate crude
oil climbed above $35 per barrel in early 2003, its
highest level since the beginning of 2000. Oil prices
had fallen to around $20 per barrel during 2001 amid
general economic weakness, but they began rising
in February and March of last year in response to
both improving global economic activity as well as
a production-limiting agreement between OPEC and
several major non-OPEC producers. Even though
production in a number of OPEC and non-OPEC
countries in fact exceeded the agreed limits last year,
heightened tensions in the Middle East along with
severe political turmoil in Venezuela continued to put
upward pressure on prices. The pressure intensiﬁed
late in the year as a strike in Venezuela that began on
December 2 virtually shut down that country’s oil
industry, and Venezuelan oil production was still well
below pre-strike levels in early 2003. Concern over a
possible war with Iraq, along with a very low level of
crude oil inventories in the United States, has helped
to keep spot prices high. Also in response to the
heightened tensions, the price of gold shot up about
30 percent over the past year.
The Financial Account
The increase in the current account deﬁcit in 2002
was about equal on balance to the stepped-up foreign
ofﬁcial purchases of U.S. assets, as changes in the
1. The dispute between the Paciﬁc Maritime Association and the
International Longshore and Warehouse Union eventually led to an
eleven-day port closure in late September and early October that
ended when President Bush invoked the Taft–Hartley Act. Although
the monthly pattern of trade was inﬂuenced by the closure, the overall





Prices of oil and of nonfuel commodities  








NOTE. The data are monthly; the last observation for oil is the average of
trading days through February 5, 2003; the last observation for nonfuel
commodities is December 2002. The oil price is the spot price of West Texas
intermediate crude oil. The price of nonfuel commodities is a weighted
average of thirty-nine primary-commodity prices from the International
Monetary Fund. 
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Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 109components of private capital ﬂows were offsetting.
Private foreign purchases of U.S. securities were
about $360 billion at an annual rate through Novem-
ber, a volume similar to last year’s total. However,
there was some shift in the composition of ﬂows
away from equities and toward Treasury securities.
This shift may have reﬂected the damping of equity
demand caused by slower economic growth and con-
tinued concern about corporate governance and
accounting. Over the same period, purchases by pri-
vate U.S. investors of foreign securities declined
nearly $100 billion. Accordingly, the net balance of
private securities trading recorded a sharp increase in
net inﬂows.
In contrast, net foreign direct investment inﬂows
fell about $70 billion between 2001 and 2002. For-
eign investment in the United States and invest-
ment abroad by U.S. residents both declined, but the
decline in ﬂows into the United States was consider-
ably larger, as merger activity slowed and corporate
proﬁts showed little vigor. U.S. direct investment




Labor markets appeared to stabilize last spring after
the sharp deterioration of 2001 and early 2002.
Employment on private payrolls, which had declined
an average of 160,000 per month in 2001, leveled
off in the spring and moved slightly higher over the
summer. But labor demand weakened again as the
economy softened later in the summer, and private
employment declined about 80,000 per month on
average in the last four months of the year. Private
payrolls rebounded nearly 150,000 in January, though
the magnitude of both the especially sharp decline
in December and the rebound in January likely was
exaggerated by difﬁculties in adjusting for the normal
seasonal movements in employment during these
months.
The manufacturing sector continued to be the
weakest segment of the labor market; even during
the spring and early summer, when the overall labor
market seemed to be improving, factory payrolls
contracted on average. Declines in factory employ-
ment were more pronounced—at about 50,000 per
month—toward the end of the year. Employment at
help-supply ﬁrms and in wholesale trade—two sec-
tors in which activity closely tracks that of manufac-
turing proper—rose over the summer but also turned
down again later in the year. And employment in
retail trade, though quite erratic, leveled off over the
summer before declining further in the fall. However,
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NOTE. The data extend through January 2003. The civilian rate is the
number of civilian unemployed divided by the civilian labor force. The
augmented rate adds to the numerator and the denominator of the civilian rate
the number of those who are not in the labor force but want a job. The small
break in the augmented rate in January 1994 arises from the introduction of a
redesigned survey. For the civilian rate, the data are monthly; for the
augmented rate, the data are quarterly through December 1993 and monthly
thereafter. 
110 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2003employment in services other than help supply grew
reasonably steadily throughout the year and rose
nearly 50,000 per month after March; health services
and education services contributed more than half of
those job gains. The ﬁnance and real estate sectors
also added jobs last year, probably because of the
surge in mortgage reﬁnancings and high levels of
activity in housing markets. Last year’s job losses in
the private sector were partially offset by an increase
in government employment that averaged about
20,000 per month; the increase resulted mostly from
hiring by states and municipalities, but it also
reﬂected hiring in the fall by the Transportation Secu-
rity Administration.
Overall employment moved lower, on net, and
the unemployment rate increased a little less than
1⁄2 percentage point over the year, to 6 percent, before
dropping back to 5.7 percent in January 2003. The
unemployment rate probably has been boosted
slightly by the federal temporary extended unemploy-
ment compensation program. By extending beneﬁts
for an additional three months, the program allows
unemployed individuals whose regular beneﬁts have
expired to be more selective in accepting job offers
and provides them with an incentive not to with-
draw from the labor force. In addition, as would be
expected in a still-weak labor market, the labor force
participation rate moved lower last year.
Productivity and Labor Costs
Labor productivity rose impressively in 2002. Output
per hour in the nonfarm business sector increased
an estimated 33⁄4 percent from the fourth quarter
of 2001 to the fourth quarter of 2002. Labor produc-
tivity typically suffers in an economic downturn as
businesses reduce hours worked by proportionally
less than the decline in output; conversely, productiv-
ity typically rebounds early in an expansion as labor
is brought back toward fuller utilization. During the
most recent downturn, however, productivity held up
comparatively well, a performance that makes last
year’s surge all the more impressive. Indeed, produc-
tivity rose at an average annual rate of nearly 3 per-
cent over the past two years, faster than the average
pace of increase during the late 1990s.
Very likely, the rapid pace of last year’s productiv-
ity growth was due in part to the special circum-
stances that developed after the September 11 attacks.
Businesses cut labor substantially in late 2001 and
early 2002 amid widespread fear of a sharp decline in
demand; when demand held up better than expected,
businesses proved able to operate satisfactorily with
their existing workforces. Moreover, the fact that this
step-up in productivity was not reversed later in the
year suggests that at least a portion of it is sustain-
able. The recent rapid growth in productivity may
derive in part from ongoing improvements in the use
of the vast amount of capital installed in earlier years,
and it may also stem from organizational innovations
induced by the weak proﬁt environment.
Indicators of hourly compensation sent mixed sig-
nals last year. The rise in the employment cost index
(ECI) for hourly compensation in private nonfarm
businesses, 31⁄4 percent, was 1 percentage point lower
than the increase in 2001. Compensation increases
likely were damped last year by the soft labor market
and expectations of lower consumer price inﬂation.
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component of the ECI both posted smaller increases
last year. The deceleration was less pronounced for
the beneﬁts component, however, which was boosted
by further large increases in employers’ health insur-
ance costs. According to the ECI, health insurance
costs, which constitute about 6 percent of overall
compensation, rose 10 percent last year after having
risen about 9 percent in each of the preceding two
years.
An alternative measure of compensation costs is
compensation per hour in the nonfarm business sec-
tor, which is derived from information in the national
income and product accounts. According to this
measure, hourly compensation rose 41⁄4 percent last
year—a little more than the increase in the ECI and
up from a much smaller increase in 2001. One impor-
tant difference between these two measures of com-
pensation is that the ECI omits stock options, while
nonfarm compensation per hour captures the value of
these options upon exercise. The very small increase
in the latter measure in 2001 likely reﬂects, in part, a
drop in option exercises in that year, and the larger
increase in 2002 may point to a ﬁrming, or at least to
a smaller rate of decline, of these exercises.
Prices
The chain-type price index for personal consumption
expenditures (PCE) rose about 2 percent last year,
compared with an increase of 11⁄2 percent in 2001.
This step-up in consumer price inﬂation resulted from
a jump in energy prices. Outside of the energy sector,
consumer price inﬂation was pushed lower last year
by continued slack in labor and product markets
as well as by expectations of future inﬂation that
appeared to be lower in 2002 than in most of 2001.
The increase in PCE prices excluding food and
energy, which was just 13⁄4 percent, was about 1⁄4 per-
centage point less than in 2001. The price index for
GDP was less affected by last year’s rise in energy
prices than was the PCE measure; much of the energy
price increase was attributable to higher prices of
imported oil, which are not included in GDP because
they are not part of domestic production. On net,
GDP prices rose only 11⁄4 percent last year, a decele-
ration of 3⁄4 percentage point that reﬂected not just the
deceleration in core consumer prices but also consid-
erably smaller increases for prices of construction.
The upturn in consumer energy prices in 2002 was
driven by a jump in crude oil prices. Gasoline prices
increased some 25 percent from December 2001 to
December 2002; prices of fuel oil increased consider-
ably as well. By contrast, consumer prices of natural
gas posted only a modest rise after declining sharply
in 2001, and electricity prices moved lower. More
recently, the rise in crude oil prices since mid-
December, together with cold weather, has increased
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Alternative measures of price change
Percent
Price measure 2001 2002
Chain-type
Gross domestic product .................. 2.0 1.3
Gross domestic purchases ................ 1.3 1.6
Personal consumption expenditures ....... 1.5 1.9
Excluding food and energy ............. 1.9 1.7
Chained CPI ............................ 1.2 1.9
Excluding food and energy ............. 1.8 1.6
Fixed-weight
Consumer price index .................... 1.9 2.3
Excluding food and energy ............. 2.7 2.1
Note. Changes are based on quarterly averages and are measured to the
fourth quarter of the year indicated from the fourth quarter of the preceding year.
112 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2003gas prices; the higher spot prices for both oil and gas
are likely to be boosting consumer energy prices
early this year.
The PCE price index for food and beverages
increased only 11⁄2 percent last year; the increase
followed a 3 percent rise in 2001 that reﬂected
supply-related price increases for many livestock
products including beef, poultry, and dairy products.
But livestock supplies had recovered by early last
year, and a drought-induced selloff of cattle herds last
summer pushed prices still lower.
The prices of goods other than food and energy
items decelerated sharply last year. Prices for apparel,
new and used motor vehicles, and a wide range of
other durable goods all declined noticeably and, on
average, at a faster pace than in 2001. Price increases
for services were much larger than for goods and
slowed less from the previous year. Both tenants’ rent
and the imputed rent of owner-occupied housing—
categories that account for a sizable share of
services—rose signiﬁcantly less last year than they
did in 2001. But many other services prices posted
increases in 2002 that were about the same as in
2001. Information on medical prices was mixed.
According to the CPI, the price of medical services
continued to accelerate, rising 51⁄2 percent last year.
But the increase in the PCE measure of medical
services prices was less than 3 percent, a smaller
increase than in 2001. One reason for this difference
is that the prices of services paid for by Medicare and
Medicaid are included in the PCE index but not in
the CPI (because services provided by Medicare and
Medicaid do not represent out-of-pocket costs to
consumers and so are outside of the CPI’s scope),
and Medicare reimbursement rates for physicians
were reduced last year.
Despite the acceleration in medical prices in the
CPI but not in the PCE price index, the CPI exclud-
ing food and energy decelerated notably more than
did the core PCE price index between 2001 and
2002. The two price measures differ in a number of
respects, but much of last year’s greater deceleration
in the CPI can be traced to the fact that the CPI
suffers from a form of ‘‘substitution bias’’ that is not
present in the PCE index. The CPI, being a ﬁxed-
weight price index, overstates increases in the cost
of living because it does not adequately take into
account the fact that consumers tend to substitute
away from goods that are rising in relative price;
by contrast, the PCE price index does a better job of
taking this substitution into account. Last year, the
Bureau of Labor Statistics began to publish a new
index called the chained CPI; like the PCE price
index, the chained CPI does a more complete job
of taking consumer substitution into account, but it
is otherwise identical to the ofﬁcial CPI. In 2001, an
unusually large gap between increases in the ofﬁcial
CPI and the chained CPI arose, pointing to very large
substitution bias in the ofﬁcial CPI in that year. This
gap narrowed in 2002, indicating that substitution
bias declined between the two years. (Final estimates
of the chained CPI are not yet available; the currently
available data for both 2001 and 2002 are preliminary
and subject to revision.)
Survey measures of expected inﬂation generally
ran a little lower in 2002 than in 2001. According to
the Michigan SRC, median one-year inﬂation expec-
tations plummeted after the September 11 attacks,
but by early 2002, expectations returned to the
23⁄4 percent range that had prevailed during the pre-
vious summer. These expectations gradually moved
lower over the course of last year and now stand
around 21⁄2 percent. Meanwhile, the Michigan SRC’s
measure of ﬁve- to ten-year inﬂation expectations
remained steady at about 23⁄4 percent during 2002, a
rate a little lower than the 3 percent inﬂation expecta-
tions that had prevailed through most of 2001.
U.S. Financial Markets
Developments in ﬁnancial markets last year were
shaped importantly by sharp declines, on net, in
equity prices and most long-term interest rates and
by periods of heightened market volatility. In contrast
to 2001, when the Federal Reserve eased the stance
of monetary policy eleven times, last year saw one
reduction in the intended federal funds rate—in early
November—and interest rates on short-term Treasury
securities had moved little until then. Longer-term
interest rates, by contrast, were more volatile. Inves-
tors’ optimism about future economic prospects
pressured longer-term Treasury bond yields higher
early in 2002. But as the year progressed, that opti-
mism faded when the economy failed to gather much
momentum, and longer-term Treasury yields ended
the year appreciably lower. Softer-than-expected
readings of the economic expansion, a marked dete-
rioration in corporate credit quality, concerns about
corporate governance, and heightened geopolitical
tensions made investors especially wary about risk.
Lower-rated ﬁrms found credit substantially more
expensive, as risk spreads on speculative-grade debt
soared for most of the year before narrowing some-
what over the last few months. Even for higher-
quality ﬁrms, risk spreads widened temporarily dur-
ing the tumultuous conditions that prevailed in
ﬁnancial markets over the summer. In addition, com-
Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 113mercial banks tightened standards and terms for busi-
ness borrowers, on net, in 2002, and risk spreads
on business loans remained in an elevated range
throughout the year. Increased caution on the part of
investors was particularly acute in the commercial
paper market, where the riskiest issuers discontinued
their programs.
Federal borrowing surged last year, while private
borrowing was held down by the signiﬁcantly
reduced credit needs of business borrowers. Declines
in longer-term interest rates during the ﬁrst half of
the year created incentives for both businesses and
households to lock in lower debt-service obligations
by heavily tapping corporate bond and home mort-
gage markets, respectively. While mortgage borrow-
ing remained strong, businesses sharply curtailed
their issuance of longer-term debt during the second
half of 2002 amid the nervousness then prevailing in
the ﬁnancial markets.
Interest Rates
Reﬂecting an unchanged stance of monetary policy
over most of last year, short-term market interest
rates moved little until early November, when the
FOMC lowered the target federal funds rate 1⁄2 per-
centage point, and other short-term interest rates fol-
lowed suit. Yields on intermediate- and long-term
Treasury securities, by contrast, declined as much as
11⁄2 percentage points, on net, in 2002. Longer-term
interest rates began last year under upward pressure,
as signs that the economy had bottomed out started to
nudge rates higher in the ﬁnal weeks of 2001. Posi-
tive economic news pushed interest rates up appre-
ciably further during the ﬁrst quarter of 2002. The
increase in longer-term interest rates was consistent
with the sharp upward tilt of money market futures
rates, which suggested that market participants
expected that the FOMC would almost double the
intended level of the funds rate by year’s end. How-
ever, as readings on the strength of the economic
expansion came in on the soft side, investors substan-
tially trimmed their expectations for policy tighten-
ing, and yields on longer-term Treasury securities
turned down in the spring.
The slide in longer-term Treasury yields intensiﬁed
over the summer amid weaker-than-expected eco-
nomic data, heightened geopolitical tensions, fresh
revelations of corporate malfeasance, and disappoint-
ing news about near-term corporate proﬁts. In con-
cert, these developments prompted investors to mark
down their expectations for economic growth and,
consequently, their anticipated path for monetary pol-
icy. A widespread retrenchment in risk-taking sent
yields on speculative-grade corporate bonds sharply
higher and kept those on the lower rungs of invest-
ment grade from declining, even as longer-term
nominal Treasury yields fell to very low levels by the
end of July.
The uneventful passing of the Securities and
Exchange Commission’s August 14 deadline for ofﬁ-
cers of large companies to certify corporate ﬁnancial
statements somewhat assuaged investors’ anxieties
about corporate governance problems. But subse-
quent news suggesting that the economy was losing
momentum and a ﬂare-up in tensions with Iraq fur-
ther boosted demand for Treasury securities. The
FOMC’s decision at the August meeting—to leave
the intended federal funds rate unchanged but to
judge the balance of risks to the outlook as weighted
toward economic weakness—pulled the expected
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shown is the implied volatility of the three-month eurodollar rate over the
coming four months, as calculated from option prices. 
114 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2003path of the funds rate lower, and longer-term Trea-
sury yields sank to forty-year lows in early autumn.
A high degree of investor uncertainty about the future
path of monetary policy was evidenced by implied
volatilities of short-term interest rates derived from
option prices, which soared to record levels in early
autumn. The size of the FOMC’s November cut in
the target federal funds rate and the shift to balance in
its assessment of risks surprised market participants,
but the policy easing appeared to lead investors to
raise the odds that the economy would pick up from
its sluggish pace. Generally positive economic news
and rising equity prices over the remainder of the
year also bolstered conﬁdence and prompted market
participants to mark up the expected path for mone-
tary policy and push up longer-term Treasury yields.
Yields on higher-quality investment-grade cor-
porate bonds generally tracked those on Treasuries
of comparable maturity last year, although risk
spreads on these instruments widened moderately
over the summer and early autumn before narrow-
ing over the remainder of the year. Interest rates on
below-investment-grade corporate debt, by contrast,
increased for much of last year, as spreads over
Treasuries ballooned in response to mounting con-
cerns about corporate credit quality, historically low
recovery rates on defaulted bonds, and revelations of
improper corporate governance; credit risk spreads
widened in all speculative sectors but especially in
telecom and energy. By the summer, investors’ retreat
from risk-taking had widened bid–asked spreads in
the corporate bond market enough to impair trading.
Risk spreads on speculative-grade bonds narrowed
considerably over the year’s ﬁnal quarter and in early
2003, though they remain elevated by historical stan-
dards; risk spreads for the weaker speculative-grade
credits remain exceptionally wide, as investors evi-
dently anticipate a continued high level of defaults
and low recovery rates.
Equity Markets
Equity prices were buffeted last year by considerable
ﬂuctuations in investors’ assessments of the outlook
for the economy and corporate earnings and by
doubts about the quality and transparency of cor-
porate balance sheets. Net declines in stock prices
in 2002 exceeded those posted during either of the
preceding two years. Worries about the pervasiveness
of questionable corporate governance and a deteriora-
tion in the earnings outlook—especially in the tech-
nology sector—depressed equity prices in early 2002.
The positive tenor of economic data, however, man-
aged to outweigh those concerns, and stock prices
staged a rally halfway through the ﬁrst quarter, with
the gains tilted toward ‘‘old economy’’ ﬁrms. But
the rebound was short lived. Share prices started to
tumble in early spring across all sectors as weaker-
than-expected economic data eroded investors’ conﬁ-
dence in the strength of the economic expansion.
These developments were reinforced by ﬁrst-quarter
corporate earnings reports that, though mostly match-
ing or exceeding investors’ expectations, painted a
bleak picture of prospective sales and proﬁts.
Over the spring and summer, accounting scandals,
widespread warnings about near-term corporate prof-
itability, and heightened geopolitical tensions inten-
siﬁed the slide in stock prices. Particularly large
declines in share prices were posted for technology
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Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 115ﬁrms, whose prospects for sales and earnings were
especially gloomy. Equity prices were boosted brieﬂy
by the uneventful passing of the August 14 dead-
line to certify ﬁnancial statements, but they quickly
reversed course on continued concerns about the pace
of economic growth and corporate earnings and the
escalating possibility of military action against Iraq.
By early October, equity indexes sank to their lowest
levels since the spring of 1997, and implied stock
price volatility on the S&P 100 surged to its highest
reading since the stock market crash of 1987. The
drop in stock prices widened the gap between the
expected year-ahead earnings–price ratio for the
S&P 500 and the real ten-year Treasury yield—one
simple measure of the equity premium—to levels not
seen since the mid-1990s.
Share prices turned around in late October, as the
third-quarter corporate earnings reports were not as
weak as investors had originally feared. Equity prices
were also given a boost in early November by the
larger-than-expected monetary policy easing, and the
rally was sustained over the remainder of the year
by the generally encouraging tone of economic data.
Greater conﬁdence among investors in the economic
outlook also helped bring down the implied volatility
on the S&P 100 signiﬁcantly by year-end, although it
remains at an elevated level by historical standards.
Despite the fourth-quarter rebound, broad equity
indexes were down, on net, about 20 percent in
2002, while the tech-heavy Nasdaq lost more than
30 percent.
The decline in equity prices during the ﬁrst three
quarters of 2002 is estimated to have erased more
than $31⁄2 trillion in household wealth, a loss of
nearly 9 percent of total household net worth,
although the fourth-quarter rise in stock prices
restored about $600 billion. Still, the level of house-
hold net worth at the end of last year was more than
40 percent higher than it was at the start of the
bull market in 1995. Equity prices maintained their
upward momentum during the ﬁrst half of January
2003 but then fell sharply amid the looming pros-
pects of military action against Iraq and a still-
gloomy outlook for corporate earnings. Broad stock
price indexes have lost almost 5 percent this year;
however, solid fourth-quarter earnings from many
prominent technology companies helped brighten
investors’ sentiment regarding that sector, and the
Nasdaq is down about 3 percent this year.
Debt and Financial Intermediation
A deceleration of business borrowing slowed growth
of the debt of nonfederal sectors about 1 percentage
point in 2002, to 61⁄2 percent. By contrast, the decline
in interest rates last year kept borrowing by house-
holds and state and local governments brisk. At the
federal level, weak tax receipts and an acceleration in
spending pushed debt growth to 71⁄2 percent last year
after a slight contraction in 2001.
For the year as a whole, corporate borrowing was
quite weak, mainly because of sagging capital expen-
ditures, a drying up of merger and acquisition activ-
ity, and a reliance on liquid assets. Although busi-
nesses tapped bond markets in volume over the ﬁrst
half of the year, subsequent concerns about the relia-
bility of ﬁnancial statements and the quality of cor-
S&P 500 forward earnings–price ratio  
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the coming year. The real rate is estimated as the difference between the
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116 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2003porate governance and deteriorating creditworthiness
ruined investors’ appetite for corporate debt in the
summer and early autumn. Households, by contrast,
ﬂocked to the mortgage markets to take advantage of
low mortgage rates throughout the year, and strong
motor vehicle sales supported the expansion of
consumer credit. For depository institutions, the net
effect of these developments was an acceleration of
credit to 61⁄2 percent last year, 2 percentage points
above the pace of 2001. The growth of credit at
thrift institutions moderated, though the slowdown
can be attributed for the most part to a large thrift
institution’s conversion to a bank charter. The
growth of credit at commercial banks accelerated to
63⁄4 percent—a signiﬁcant increase from the anemic
pace in 2001; the pickup was driven by large acquisi-
tions of securities, especially mortgage-backed secu-
rities, as well as a surge in home equity and residen-
tial real estate lending.
By contrast, business lending at commercial banks
dropped 7 percent last year after falling almost 4 per-
cent in 2001; last year’s decline kept overall loan
growth for 2002 to about 5 percent. In the October
Senior Loan Ofﬁcer Opinion Survey on Bank Lend-
ing Practices, respondents noted that the decline in
commercial and industrial (C&I) lending since the
beginning of the year reﬂected not only the limited
funding needs of creditworthy borrowers that found
bond ﬁnancing or a runoff of liquid assets more
attractive, but also a reduction in the pool of credit-
worthy borrowers. Over the course of last year, banks
reported some additional net tightening of standards
and terms on C&I loans, mainly in response to greater
uncertainty about the economic outlook and rising
corporate bond defaults, although the proportions of
banks that reported doing so declined noticeably.
Direct measures of loan pricing conditions from the
Federal Reserve’s quarterly Survey of Terms of Busi-
ness Lending also indicated that banks were cautious
lenders last year, as the average spread of C&I loan
rates over market interest rates on instruments of
comparable maturity remained wide, and spreads
on new higher-risk loans declined only slightly from
the lofty levels that prevailed over the ﬁrst half of
the year. Although bank lenders were wary about
business borrowers, especially toward lower-rated
credits, they did not signiﬁcantly constrict the sup-
ply of loans: Most small ﬁrms surveyed by the
National Federation of Independent Businesses in
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NOTE. The data are based on a survey generally conducted four times per
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medium-sized firms are those with annual sales of $50 million or more. Net
percentage is the percentage reporting a tightening less the percentage
reporting an easing. 
SOURCE. Federal Reserve, Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank
Lending Practices. 
Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 1172002 reported that they experienced little or no difﬁ-
culty satisfying their borrowing needs.
Loan quality at commercial banks improved over-
all last year. Loan delinquency rates edged down
through the third quarter of 2002—the latest period
for which Call Report data are available—in response
to better performance of residential real estate and
consumer loans and a stable delinquency rate on C&I
loans. Despite the improvement in consumer loan
quality, domestic banks imposed somewhat more
stringent credit conditions when lending to house-
holds, according to the survey on bank lending prac-
tices. Moderate net proportions of surveyed institu-
tions tightened credit standards and terms for credit
card and other consumer loans throughout last year.
The net fraction of banks that tightened standards on
residential mortgage loans rose late in the year to
the highest share in the past decade, but nonetheless
remained quite low. Commercial banks generally reg-
istered strong proﬁt gains last year, although steep
losses on loans to energy and telecommunications
ﬁrms signiﬁcantly depressed proﬁts at several large
bank holding companies. Despite the increased rate
of provisioning for loan losses, the banking sector’s
proﬁtability stayed in the elevated range recorded for
the past several years, as a result of the robust fee
income from mortgage and credit card lending, effec-
tive cost controls, and the relatively inexpensive
funding offered by inﬂows of core deposits. As of
the third quarter of last year, virtually all assets in
the banking sector were at well-capitalized institu-
tions, and the substitution of securities for loans on
banks’ balance sheets helped edge up risk-based capi-
tal ratios.
The ﬁnancial condition of insurance companies, by
contrast, worsened notably last year. Both property
and casualty insurers and life and health insur-
ers sustained signiﬁcant investment losses from the
decline in equity prices and the deterioration in cor-
porate credit quality. However, these negative pres-
sures were offset somewhat by the continued strong
growth of insurance premiums, and both sectors of
the insurance industry stayed fairly well capitalized
in 2002.
Monetary Aggregates
The broad monetary aggregates decelerated notice-
ably last year after surging in 2001. Short-term mar-
ket interest rates, which had declined swiftly dur-
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common equity and certain perpetual preferred stock. Tier 2 capital consists
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118 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2003ing 2001, were stable over the ﬁrst half of the year;
deposit rates, in a typical pattern of lagged adjust-
ment, continued to fall. Consequently, the opportu-
nity cost of holding M2 assets increased, especially
for its liquid deposit (checking and savings accounts)
and retail money fund components, thereby restrain-
ing the demand for such assets. After decelerating in
the ﬁrst half of the year, M2 rebounded signiﬁcantly
in the second half, because of a surge in liquid
deposits and retail money market mutual funds. The
strength in both components partly reﬂected elevated
volatility in equity markets against the backdrop of
a still-low opportunity cost of holding such deposits.
In addition, another wave of mortgage reﬁnancing
boosted M2 growth during this period. (Reﬁnancings
cause prepayments to accumulate temporarily in
deposit accounts before being distributed to investors
in mortgage-backed securities.) All told, over the
four quarters of the year, M2 increased 7 percent, a
pace that exceeded the expansion of nominal income.
As a result, M2 velocity—the ratio of nominal GDP
to M2—declined for the ﬁfth year in a row, roughly
in line with the drop in the opportunity cost of M2
over this period.
Reﬂecting in part the slowing of its M2 compo-
nent, M3—the broadest money aggregate—expanded
61⁄2 percent in 2002, a pace well below the 123⁄4 per-
cent advance posted in 2001. Growth in M3 was also
held down by a sharp deceleration of institutional
money funds, as their yields dropped to close align-
ment with short-term market interest rates. This effect
was only partly offset by the pickup in needs to fund
bank credit, which resulted in an acceleration in the
issuance of managed liabilities, including large time
deposits. M3 velocity continued to decline in 2002.
New Discount Window Programs
On October 31, 2002, following a three-month public
comment period, the Board of Governors approved
changes to its Regulation A that established two new
types of loans to depository institutions—primary
and secondary credit—and discontinued the adjust-
ment and extended credit programs. The new pro-
grams were implemented on January 9, 2003. The
seasonal credit program was not altered.
The primary reason for adopting the new programs
was to eliminate the subsidy to borrowing institu-
tions that was implicit in the basic discount rate,
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opportunity cost of holding M2 is a two-quarter moving average of the
difference between the three-month Treasury bill rate and the weighted
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market interest rates. The subsidy required Fed-
eral Reserve Banks to administer credit extensions
heavily in order to ensure that borrowing institu-
tions used credit only in appropriate circumstances—
speciﬁcally, when they had exhausted other reason-
ably available funding sources. That administration
was necessarily somewhat subjective and conse-
quently difﬁcult to apply consistently across Reserve
Banks. In addition, the heavy administration was one
factor that caused depository institutions to become
reluctant to use the window even in appropriate con-
ditions. Also, depository institutions were concerned
at times about being marked with a ‘‘stigma’’ if
market analysts and counterparties inferred that the
institution was borrowing from the window and sus-
pected that the borrowing signaled that the institution
was having ﬁnancial difﬁculties. The resulting reluc-
tance to use the window reduced its usefulness in
buffering shocks to the reserve market and in serving
as a backup source of liquidity to depository insti-
tutions, and thus undermined its performance as a
monetary policy tool.
To address these issues, the Board of Governors
speciﬁed that primary credit may be made available
at an above-market interest rate to depository insti-
tutions in generally sound ﬁnancial condition. The
above-market interest rate eliminates the implicit
subsidy. Also, restricting eligibility for the program
to generally sound institutions should reduce insti-
tutions’ concerns that their borrowing could signal
ﬁnancial weakness.
The Federal Reserve set the initial primary credit
rate at 2.25 percent, 100 basis points above the
FOMC’s target federal funds rate as of January 9,
2003. The target federal funds rate remained
unchanged, and thus the adoption of the new pro-
grams did not represent a change in the stance of
monetary policy. In the future, the primary credit
rate will be adjusted from time to time as appropriate,
using the same discretionary procedure that was
used in the past to set the adjustment credit rate. The
Federal Reserve also established procedures to reduce
the primary credit rate to the target federal funds rate
in a national emergency, even if key policymakers
are unavailable.
Institutions that do not qualify for primary credit
may obtain secondary credit when the borrowing is
consistent with a prompt return to market sources of
funds or is necessary to resolve severe ﬁnancial difﬁ-
culties. The interest rate on secondary credit is set by
formula 50 basis points above the primary credit rate.
The rate was set initially at 2.75 percent. Because
secondary credit borrowers are not in sound ﬁnan-
cial condition, extensions of secondary credit usually
involve some administration.
International Developments
The international economy rebounded in 2002 after
a stagnant performance in 2001, but recovery was
uneven in both timing and geographical distribution.
Growth abroad picked up sharply in the ﬁrst half of
last year, as a strong rally in the high-tech exporting
economies in developing Asia was joined by robust
growth in Canada and, to a lesser extent, Mexico.
Japan also posted respectable growth in the ﬁrst
half, largely as a result of a surge of exports. How-
ever, performance in the euro area remained sluggish,
and several South American economies experienced
difﬁculties, with full-ﬂedged crises in Argentina and
Venezuela and mounting concerns about prospects
for Brazil. As the U.S. economy decelerated in the
second half, the rapid pace of recovery slowed in
developing Asia and in Canada, while performance
remained lackluster in much of the rest of the world.
Monetary policy actions abroad also diverged
across countries in 2002 as authorities reacted to
differing economic conditions. In Canada, ofﬁcial
interest rates were raised in three steps by July amid
concerns that buoyant domestic demand and sharply
rising employment would ignite inﬂationary pres-
sures. Monetary authorities in Australia and Sweden
also increased policy rates in the ﬁrst half of the year.
However, as economic conditions weakened around
the world in the second half, ofﬁcial interest rates
were held constant in Canada and Australia and were
lowered in Sweden. Monetary policy was held steady
throughout 2002 in the United Kingdom, where
growth was moderate and inﬂation subdued, but ofﬁ-
cial interest rates were lowered 25 basis points, to
3.75 percent, in early February 2003 in response to
concerns about the prospects for global and domes-
tic demand. The European Central Bank (ECB) held
rates constant through most of the year, as inﬂation
remained above the ECB’s 2 percent target ceiling,
but rates were lowered 50 basis points in Decem-
ber as the euro area’s already weak recovery appeared
to be stalling. Japanese short-term interest rates
remained near zero, while authorities took some lim-
ited further steps to stimulate demand through nontra-
ditional channels. Monetary policy was tightened in
both Mexico and Brazil in response to concerns about
the inﬂationary effects of past currency depreciation.
Yield curves in the major foreign industrial coun-
tries steepened and shifted up in the ﬁrst quarter of
2002 in response to generally favorable economic
120 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2003news, but later they ﬂattened out and moved back
down as the outlook deteriorated. Similarly, equity
prices in the major foreign industrial economies held
up well early in the year but then declined along with
the U.S. stock market and ended the year down
sharply from the previous year. The performance of
the stock markets in the emerging-market econo-
mies was mixed. Share prices in Brazil and Mexico
fell sharply in the second and third quarters but
then showed some improvement toward the end
of the year. In the Asian emerging-market econo-
mies, equity prices rose in the ﬁrst half of 2002 on
a general wave of optimism, especially in the high-
technology producing economies; equity prices began
to decline around midyear as global demand softened
but posted modest rebounds late in the year.
The foreign exchange value of the dollar continued
its mild upward trend into the early part of 2002, as it
appeared that the United States was poised to lead a
global economic recovery. However, the dollar weak-
ened sharply in the late spring and early summer
amid deepening concerns about U.S. corporate gover-
nance and proﬁtability. Around that time market ana-
lysts also appeared to become more worried about the
growing U.S. current account deﬁcit and its potential
negative inﬂuence on the future value of the dollar.
The dollar rebounded somewhat around midyear as
growth prospects for other major economies, particu-
larly in the euro area, appeared to dim; the dollar
dropped back again late in the year, as geopolitical
tensions intensiﬁed, and continued to depreciate in
early 2003. In nominal terms the dollar has declined
about 5 percent on balance over the past year, with
depreciations against the currencies of the major
industrial countries and several of the developing
Asian economies partly offset by appreciation against
the currencies of several Latin American countries.
Industrial Economies
The Canadian economy recorded the strongest per-
formance among the major foreign industrial coun-
tries last year despite some slowing in the second
half. The strength, which was largely homegrown,
reﬂected robust growth of consumption and residen-
tial construction as well as an end to inventory run-
offs early in the year. The expansion was accom-
panied by very rapid increases in employment and
utilization of capacity, and the core inﬂation rate
breached the upper end of the government’s 1 per-
cent to 3 percent target range near the end of the year.
The Canadian dollar appreciated against the U.S.
dollar in the ﬁrst half of the year, but it dropped back
somewhat in the second half as the economy slowed;
by the end of the year it was up only slightly on
balance. The Canadian dollar has moved up some-
what more so far this year.
The Japanese economy recorded positive growth
during 2002, although it was not enough to fully
reverse the decline in output that occurred in 2001.
Despite about 10 percent appreciation of the yen
against the dollar in 2002, Japanese growth was
driven largely by exports, with smaller contributions
from both increased consumption and a slower pace
of inventory reduction. In contrast, private invest-
ment continued to decline, although not as sharply
as in 2001. Labor market conditions remained quite
depressed, and consumer prices continued to fall.
Little progress was made on the serious structural
problems that have plagued the Japanese economy,
including the massive and growing amount of bad











NOTE. The data are weekly. The last observations are the average of
trading days through February 5, 2003. 










NOTE. The data are weekly. The last observations are the average of
trading days through February 5, 2003. 
Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 121loans on the books of Japanese banks. A new set of
ofﬁcial measures that aims at halving the value of bad
loans within two and a half years was announced in
the fall, but the details of this plan are still not fully
speciﬁed. In September, the Bank of Japan announced
a plan to buy shares from banks with excessive
holdings of equity, which would help to reduce bank
exposure to stock market ﬂuctuations. Because the
transactions are to occur at market prices, there would
be no net ﬁnancial transfer to the banks. Near the end
of last year the Bank of Japan (BOJ) raised its target
range for bank reserves at the BOJ from ¥10–15 tril-
lion to ¥15–20 trillion, increased the monthly amount
of its outright purchases of long-term government
bonds, and broadened the range of collateral that
can be used for market operations. In December the
monetary base was up about 20 percent from a year
earlier, a rise partially reﬂecting the increased level
of bank reserves at the BOJ. However, the twelve-
month rate of base money growth was considerably
below the 36 percent pace registered in April. Broad
money growth remains subdued.
Economic performance in the euro area was quite
sluggish last year. Although exports were up sharply,
growth in consumption was modest, and private
investment declined. The area’s lackluster economic
performance pushed the unemployment rate up by
several tenths of a percentage point by the end of
the year. Economic weakness was particularly pro-
nounced in some of the larger countries—Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, and, to a lesser extent, France.
In contrast, growth in Spain and some of the smaller
euro-area countries—Ireland, Portugal, Finland, and
Greece—was much more robust. Headline inﬂation
jumped to a bit above 21⁄2 percent early in the year,
owing to higher food and energy prices and in small
part to the introduction of euro notes and coins.
Increased slack in the economy, however, together
with the 15 percent appreciation of the euro by the
end of the year, helped to mitigate inﬂation concerns,
and the ECB lowered its policy interest rate in
December. The euro continued to appreciate in early
2003.
Economic growth in the United Kingdom held up
better than in the other major European countries last
year, and sterling strengthened about 10 percent
versus the dollar. However, the expansion remained
uneven, with the services sector continuing to grow
more rapidly than the smaller manufacturing sector.
Despite tight labor markets, inﬂation remained a bit
below the Bank of England’s target of 21⁄2 percent for
most of the past year. A sharp rise in housing prices
has, however, raised some concern about the possibil-
ity of a real estate price bubble. The British govern-
ment announced its intention to complete a rigorous
assessment of its criteria for joining the European
Monetary Union (EMU) by the middle of this year
and, if they are met, to hold a referendum on entry.
Emerging-Market Economies
The Brazilian economy posted a surprisingly strong
rebound in 2002 despite a major political transition
and accompanying turbulence in ﬁnancial markets.
The Brazilian real depreciated sharply between May
and October, and sovereign bond spreads climbed to
2,400 basis points as it became increasingly likely
that Luiz Ina ´cio Lula da Silva (Lula), the Workers’
Party candidate, would win the presidential election.
Given some of the past stances of the party, this
possibility fueled concerns among foreign investors
about a potential erosion of ﬁscal and monetary disci-
pline. In response to the sharp deterioration in ﬁnan-
cial conditions facing Brazil, a $30 billion IMF pro-
gram was approved in September 2002, $6 billion of
which was disbursed by the end of the year. However,
ﬁnancial conditions improved markedly after Lula
won the election in late October and appointed a
cabinet perceived to be supportive of orthodox ﬁscal
and monetary policies, including greater central bank
independence. By January 2003 the real had reversed
about one-fourth of its previous decline against the
dollar, and bond spreads had fallen sharply. However,
the new administration still faces some major chal-
lenges. In particular, serious concerns remain over
the very large quantity and relatively short maturity
of the outstanding government debt. In addition, last
year’s currency depreciation fueled a rise in inﬂation











NOTE. The data are weekly. Exchange rates are in foreign currency units
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122 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2003that has prompted several increases in the monetary
policy interest rate. In January the government raised
the upper bound of its inﬂation target range for this
year to 8.5 percent from 6.5 percent, although the
target for next year was lowered at the same time to
5.5 percent from 6.25 percent.
Argentine GDP contracted further in 2002 after
declining 10 percent in 2001. The currency board
arrangement that had pegged the peso at a one-to-one
rate with the dollar collapsed early last year; the peso
lost nearly three-fourths of its value by late June, and
sovereign bond spreads spiked to more than 7,000
basis points. By early 2002, the banking system had
become effectively insolvent as a result of the plung-
ing peso, the weak economy, and the government’s
default on debt that the banks held mostly involun-
tarily. Confronted with this situation, the govern-
ment forced the conversion of the banks’ dollar-
denominated assets and liabilities to pesos and also
mandated the rescheduling of a large share of depos-
its. As a result of these and other measures, conﬁ-
dence in the banking system, already shaken, was
further impaired. Financial and economic conditions
eventually stabilized in the second half of the year,
but there are no signs yet of a sustained recovery. The
government also defaulted on obligations to multi-
lateral creditors in late 2002 and early 2003. In Janu-
ary, Argentina and the International Monetary Fund
reached agreement on a $6.6 billion short-term pro-
gram that will go to meeting Argentina’s payments to
the IMF at least through the elections expected in the
spring and also to clearing its overdue obligations to
the multilateral development banks.
Venezuela experienced extreme economic and
political turmoil over the past year. In February 2002
the central bank abandoned the bolivar’s crawling
peg to the dollar, and the bolivar depreciated sharply.
Opponents of President Hugo Chavez mounted a
short-lived coup in April and declared a national
strike in early December. The strike brought the
already-weak economy to a standstill, and output in
the key oil industry plummeted. The strike abated
in early February in all sectors but oil. In response to
the strike, Chavez increased his control of the state-
owned oil company and oil production began rising
in early 2003, but it was still well below pre-strike
levels. With the exchange rate plunging in late Janu-
ary, the government suspended currency trading for
two weeks before establishing a ﬁxed exchange rate
regime and some restrictions on foreign currency
transactions.
One of the few bright spots in Latin America last
year was the Mexican economy. Boosted by the U.S.
recovery, growth was moderate for the year as a
whole despite some late slowing. However, ﬁnan-
cial conditions deteriorated somewhat after midyear
as market participants reevaluated the strength of the
North American recovery. Mexican stock prices slid
about 25 percent between April and September, and
sovereign bond spreads widened nearly 200 basis
points to around 430 basis points over the same
period. Nevertheless, the Mexican economy did not
appear to be much affected by spillovers from the
problems elsewhere in Latin America; bond spreads
dropped sharply between October and the end of the
year to around 300 basis points, a level considerably
lower than elsewhere in the region. The peso depre-
ciated about 12 percent against the dollar over the
course of last year. The decline fueled an increase
in twelve-month inﬂation to more than 51⁄2 percent
by year-end. The acceleration put inﬂation above
the government target rate of 41⁄2 percent and well
above the ambitious 3 percent target set for 2003. In
response to increasing inﬂation, the Bank of Mexico
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Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 123tember 2002. The peso has continued to depreciate in
early 2003, and bond spreads have moved back up a
bit.
The Asian emerging-market economies generally
performed well in 2002, although there were signiﬁ-
cant differences within the region. Outside of China,
the strongest growth was recorded in South Korea,
which beneﬁted in the ﬁrst half of the year from both
an upturn in global demand for high-tech products
and a surge in domestic demand, particularly con-
sumption. However, consumer conﬁdence deterio-
rated at the end of the year as tensions over North
Korea intensiﬁed; the uneasy situation, as well as the
substantial existing consumer debt burden, pose sig-
niﬁcant risks to growth in consumption this year. The
Korean won appreciated sharply against the dollar
between April and midyear in response to improv-
ing economic conditions; it then dropped back in late
summer and early fall as perceptions about the
strength of the global recovery were adjusted down-
ward. However, the won turned back up against the
dollar late last year.
The performance of the ASEAN-5 economies—
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
and Thailand—also was generally robust in 2002,
although the overall softening in global demand in
the second half of the year was evident there as well.
The second-half slowing in production was par-
ticularly pronounced in Singapore, which is heavily
dependent on exports of high-technology products.
Taiwan, another high-technology producer, also
showed a signiﬁcant deceleration in output between
the ﬁrst and second halves of the year. Both of these
economies experienced some mild deﬂation in 2002,
although prices turned up toward the end of the year.
Although the Hong Kong economy did not show
as much improvement as most other emerging Asian
economies in the ﬁrst half of last year, it recorded
very strong growth in the third quarter. Nevertheless,
prices continued to fall for the fourth consecutive
year. The mainland Chinese economy, which again
outperformed the rest of the region in 2002, enjoyed
surging investment by the government and by foreign
investors as well as robust export growth. The Chi-
nese economy continued to experience mild deﬂation
last year.
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